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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMEN·T OF' F'ACTS 
The statement of facts which appears in the ap-
pellant's brief under that portion labled "The Complaint" 
which recites certain allegations in the plaintiff's com-
plaint, is substantially accurate. No point would be served 
by repeating those allegations. 
Under the heading "Facts Established by the Evi-
dence", the appellant reviews certain portions of the 
evidence and testimony. These also are essentially ac-
curate and correct, except for repe-ated statements by 
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appellant's counsel that the evidence is thoroughly con-
clusive that there is no possible negligence on the part of 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company and no evidence what-
ever upon which liability might be imposed upon that 
company. These statements are, of course, self-serving, 
and upon reading them one wonders how such a law 
suit could have arisen at all. Respondents take a com-
pletely contrary view, of course, and feel it necessary 
to call to the attention of the Court certain matters al-
leged in this portion of the appellant's brief. 
On page 5 of the appellant's brief the statement is 
made that the gas furnace, gas water heater, gas service 
line, gas meter and gas regula tor were all examined and 
none showed any signs of leakage. In the argument, 
under Point I, the respondents will contradict this state-
ment and point to evidence which shows otherwise. 
On page 7 of the appellant's brief the statement ap-
pears that all of the evidence points to the fact that the 
gas main was struck and kinked by a mechanical digger. 
In the argument under Point I testimony from the record 
will be set forth in direct contradiction of this statement. 
Further, upon page 7 of the appellant's brief, the state-
ment is made that the defendants, Lundberg and Todd, 
and their witnesses were evasive and never denied that 
they had kinked or bent the gas main with a mechanical 
digger. In the argument respondent will set forth their 
testimony in direct contradiction of this statement. 
Further, the Court's attention is invited to the jury 
verdicts (R. 43-50), in which the jury found in favor of 
Todd and Lundberg and against the plaintiffs. 
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The material under the heading "Proceedings Fol-
lowing Close of Evidence" the respondents feel is essen-
k tially correct. 
STATEl\1EN·T OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT AND RESULTING 
JUDGMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WIT:S:STANDING THE VERDICT. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED THE 
APPELLANT FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE IN SUP-




THERE WAS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT TIIE JURY VERDICT AND RESULTING 
JUDGMENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WFTHSTANDING THE VERDI•CT. 
In support of Point I, in the appellant's brief certain 
Utah cases are cited and the legal principles therein set 
forth respondents feel are correct. We feel it worthwhile 
to comment upon a portion of a quotation from Seybold 
v. Union Pacifie Railroad Company, 239' P. 2d 174, which 
appears in 'appellant's brief. The Court says, among 
other things, the following: 
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"If there is any substantial competent evidence 
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably 
could make the filnding, it should stand." 
The only problem, therefore, is in the application of 
this principle to the evidence adduced at the trial. The 
burden of the respondents is to point out wherein suf-
ficient competent evidence was presented from which the 
jury could have acted as it did. 
Counsel for the appellant makes the statement at 
page 5 of the brief that the only conflict in the evidence 
is whether gas escaping from the break in the gas main 
entered the basement of the Friedman home through the 
East wall or at the South end of the house near the 
entrance of the gas service line, and that such conflict 
is immaterial. With this statement the respondents com-
pletely disagree. 
A. portion of the evidence presented to the jury was 
Exhibit 33, a section of the gas main which was bent and 
broken and from which gas escaped. 
Let us assume, for purposes of argument, that the 
source of gas which exploded in the basement of the 
Friedn1an home was from the break in the gas main in 
the street. The appellant vigorously disclaims any 
culpability for the break, although the jury verdicts (R. 
43-50) clearly sl1ow otherwise and that the jury felt that 
the primary responsibility for the condition of the gas 
main was th'at of the appellant, Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company. 
The testimony of Todd and Lundberg and their 
witnesses should be called to the attention of the Court. 
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Todd, who was an excavating contractor, testified res-
pecting his work in the area and that his machine and 
his employee probably excavated for the water service 
line at the Friedman home. Todd specifically and clearly 
denied ( R. 500, Tr. 366) that his machine or his employee 
ever hit the gas main or touched it in any way. Clyde 
Boggess, an employee of Todd, testified that the mechani-
cal digger was never used to dig a trench completely to 
the water main, but that the exc-avation for the last few 
feet was done by hand with a shovel. Boggess testified 
that he did the shovel work and specifically denies ( R. 
510, Tr. 376) that the mechanical digger ever hit the gas 
main. 
Lundberg, one of the defendants, testified that he is 
a plumbing contractor and that he laid the water service 
lines in the area and also for the Friedman home. Lund-
berg testified (R. 487, Tr. 353), that the last portion of 
the excavation to the water service main was done by 
hand. Lundberg further specifically denied that he or 
any of his employees (R. 292, Tr. 158), ever exeavated 
for the water line or ever touched or bent the gas main. 
Respondents feel that this is certainly evidence from 
which the jury could have found as it did, that the gas 
main was not bent by either of the defendants, Todd or 
Lundberg. 
It should be pointed out that no other solution to the 
bent pipe or theory as to how it happened was ever 
offered by the appellant. 
Let us now assume for purposes of argument that 
tlJel,,: the gas main was laid perfectly and without a bend or 
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break, as the appellant clamorously contends (although 
the jury apparently didn't believe it). Does that fact 
alone relieve Mountain Fuel Supply Company from the 
charge of negligence or responsibility~ The respondents 
feel that it does not necessarily have that result. 
In the first place, a high degree of care is imposed 
upon persons handling dangerous substances. Natural 
gas sold and dispensed by the appellant falls in that 
category. 
Wit:k respect to the degree of care imposed, the fol-
lowing statement appears in Volume 24, American J u-
risprudence, page 682-3, paragraph 24, under the heading 
"Gas Companies": 
"It is generally held that a gas company must 
exercise care and diligence in order to avoid injury 
to the health or property of others by the escape 
of gas. The degree of care which it must exercise 
has been described as ordinary care, as due and 
reasonable care, and as a high degree of care. 
These terms, however, are said to mean no more 
than that care and diligence should vary according 
to the exigencies which require vigilance and at-
tention, conforming in amount and degree to the 
particular circumstances under which they are to 
be exerted. In other wo·rds, in view of the highly 
dangerous character of gas and its tendency to 
escape a gas company must use a 'degree of care 
to prevent the escape of gas from its pipes pro-
portionate to the daJnger which it is its duty to 
a,void." 
Numerous cases are cited in support thereof, in-
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There is further imposed upon gas companies the 
necessity for maintaining a system of inspection of its 
lines which will prevent the escape of gas and possible 
injury to third persons. A good statement of the require-
ment to inspect is found in paragraph 26, under "Gas 
Companies", page 683, of Volume 24, American juris-
prudence. This statement is as follows: 
"As pointed out above, a gas company must main-
tain such a system of inspection as will insure 
reasonable promptness in the detection of leaks 
that may occur from the deterioration of the 
material of its pipes or from any other cause 
within the circmnspection of men of ordinary skill 
in the business, including the careless or wrongful 
meddling of third persons and, except in cases 
of breaks caused by some sudden calamity or an 
emergency created by some happening which 
causes many leaks at the same time, the gas 
company should be prepared, with a sufficient 
force, to repair any defects that may be discover-
ed.'' 
In this connection the Court's attention is invited 
to the case of Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Kelly, an Oklahoma 
case, found at 232 P. 428. With respect to the duty of 
inspection the Court says at page 430: 
"The gas company owes the duty to see that the 
pipe lines and fittings, when first laid in the 
ground, with reasonable care and skill, will not 
permit the escape of gas, and a system of inspec-
tion is required as will result in reasonable 
promptness in the discovery of leaks, which may 
occur from deterioration of the material, or from 
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The Court's attention is invited to the statement 
from American Juris prudence requiring gas companies 
by inspection to protect against happenings within their 
knowledge or contemplation, including the careles·s or 
wrongful meddling of third persons. 
In connection with an examination of this matter, 
the doctrine of concurrent negligence should he con-
sidered. Assuming for argument that negligent installa-
tion of the gas main and the subsequent negligent excava-
tion resulted in damage to the main. The subsequent 
negligence of a third person not connected with the 
appellant does not relieve appellant, in the absence of 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, from 
the imposition of liability. 
A good statement of the doctrine of concurrent 
negligence is found in the Utah case of Hillyard v. 
Utah By-Products Co., 263 P. 2d. 287. This case involved 
a collision by ·a moving vehicle with one improperly 
parked, resulting in death to a passenger in the moving 
car. ·The statement of the doctrine of concurrent negli-
gence, Jlowever, respondents feel is applicable to this 
situation as well as to a collision. 
Mr. Justice Crockett says the following in the opin-
ion, at page 290 of 263 P. 2d: 
"In ·addressing the question whether the parking 
of the truck on the highway was an act of negli-
gence, it should be remembered that an act is not 
necessarily rendered non-negligent merely be-
cause it may Ee said that no injury would result 
to another except for some subsequent act of 
negligence. One is guilty of negligence when 'he 
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does such an act or omits to take such a precau-
tion that under the circumstances present, as an 
ordinary prudent person, he ought reasonably to 
foresee that he will thereby expose the interests of 
another to an unreasonable risk of harm.' When 
one does so he may be held liable for resulting 
injuries caused by any reasonably foreseeable 
conduct whether it be innocent, negligent or even 
criminal." 
The court further makes this statement on the same 
page: 
" ' * * the test of liability is not whether * * * the 
defendant could * * * have foreseen the precise 
form in which the injury actually resulted, but 
he must be held for anything which * * * appears 
to have been a natural and probable consequence 
of his act. If the act is one which (he) * * * could 
have anticipated as likely to result in injury, * * * 
although he could not have anticipated the parti-
cular injury which did occur.' The court was 
therefore justified in submitting the question of 
defendant's negligence in parking the truck to 
the jury; and the latter were warranted in finding 
that such negligence existed." 
In the light of these legal principles, namely, the 
high degree of care imposed, the duty to inspect, and 
concurrent negligence, let us examine the testimony. 
The testimony of D .. J. Robison, Assistant Super-
intendent of Distribution of the appellant, is significant. 
Mr. Robison testified that there was no phase of the 
installation, distribution or maintenance of natural gas 
with which he was not familiar. (R. 221, Tr. 87) 
He testified that no inspection of the gas main had 
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been made from its installation in about February, 1948, 
until the explosion inN ovember, 1951. (R. 231, Tr. 97) 
He further testified that the gas main was laid after 
the water main. (R. 228, Tr. 94) He further said that 
the gas main in some places near where the break oc-
curred was laid six inches from the water main. (R. 229, 
Tr. 95) 
Mr. Robison was questioned concerning a deposition 
taken before the trial about the method of inspection 
used by the appellant. 
We feel it proper to quote from his testimony in 
this respect, which is a.s follows: (R. 232, Tr. 98, R. 233, 
Tr. 9·9) 
"Q. Now, Mr. Robison, you will recall on last 
Friday I took a deposition, and you testified 
to certain things in response to my questions; 
do you recall, in connection with that deposi-
tion-on Page 17 we are referring to-that 
this' question was asked : 
'As a matter of fact, in your company policy, 
how frequently do you check the mains in that 
area, or any other areas that you serve, for 
breaks or damage~' 
Do you remember making the answer: 
'I don't know.' 
A. I believe I did, and said, 'N Q,' with the idea 
in mind that you meant digging them up and 
making ~a visual inspection of them. 
Q. Do you recall being asked the question, then : 
'You do not know~' 
And you recall making the answer: 
'I don't believe they are tested.' 
10 
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A. That's right. 
Q. You recall being asked the question: 
'As far as you know, you have no regular 
program of inspection f 
Do you remember making the answer: 
'There is none.' 
A. There is none. There is no regular program; 
there is a program. 
Q. And the further question: 
'Of any of your mains~' 
And do you recall making the answer : 
'That's right.' 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now, do you recall being asked this question: 
'When trouble occurs, you go out and inspect 
themf 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do you reeall making the answer : 
'Correct.'" 
In view of Mr. Robison's position with the appel-
lant company, and his kn<YWledge of the business, he 
seems qualified to comment that they have no policy 
of inspection. 
Some further testimony by Yr. Robison is also 
significant with regard to the policy of laying of gas 
mains in the proximity of water mains and other facili-
ties. He testified as follows: (R. 228, Tr. 94) 
"Q. Now, will you refer again to Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit 33, and tell me, if you can, from an ex-
amination of it, approximately the distance 
11 
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between the gas main and the water main, as 
MR. KASTLER: That is '32'. 
(Discussion.) 
MR. ALLEN: Yes, I am referring now to Ex-
hibit 32, the diagram. 
A. The lines were laid between six inches and a 
foot apart. 
Q. In some places they are as close as six inches? 
A. Yes ·sir. 
Q. Now, Mr. Robison, what is the general prae-
tice with reference to the laying of gas mains, 
by your company, adjacent to water mains·¥ 
A. We try to lay them away from the water 
mains some distance. 
Q. In some instances, if it is possible, you put 
them across the street, do you not f 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And this at least down the section that existed 
in front of the Friedman home was laid pretty 
clos-e to the water main f 
A. Fairly close. 
Q. Now, why is it that you have a policy of laying 
the gws main at some distance from the water 
main¥ 
A. So that there will he no difficulty in us dig-
ging up our gas main, or the water company 
connecting onto their water main, that we 
will not get together and not get the wrong 
pipe for-there will be room for each com-
pany to work on their individual lines. 
12 
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Q. In other words, you lay them at some dis-
tance, so there won't be any danger of people 
interfering with your gas lines, if they are 
digging for some other legitimate purpose~ 
A. Correct. 
Q. You recognize there Is possibility of that 
occurring~ 
A. Yes sir." 
It is clear from his testimony in this regard that the 
gas company normally tries to lay its lines some distance 
frmn water mains and other facilities for the very reason 
that they are likely to be damaged by third persons 
making legitimate installations. It is further clear that 
this hazard is clearly within the contemplation of the 
appeHant company. 
The respondents therefore submit that upon the basis 
of the testimony here adduced, there was sufficient com-
petent evidence from which the jury could find that the 
appellant company was negligent in failing to maintain 
any policy of inspection or that it was concurrently 
negligent, assuming a third party bent the gas main in 
laying the gas main so close to the water main when 
there was a clear recognizable possibility that it would 
be interfered with by third persons, and that such inter-
ference might cause damage. 
Previously in this brief the statement has been made 
that respondents dispute the contention of appellant that 
there could be no disagreement as to the source of the 
gas which escaped in the Friedman home and exploded. 
There is other evidence in the record which points to the 
13 
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possibility that the gas may have come from a defective 
meter or gas regulator, and that under the evidence and 
the instructions of the Court, the jury might have so 
concluded. 
In this connection respondents desire to call the 
Court's attention to Instructions 25 and 26 (R. 111) which 
are as follows: 
INSTRUCTION 25 
"If you find that gas causing the explosion es-
caped from some other source than the damaged 
pipe in the street, you will find for defendant, 
Todd, No Cause of Action." 
INSTRUCTION 26 
"If you can reasonably determine from the pre-
ponderance of evidence presented in this case that 
the gas that caused the explosion in plaintiffs' 
house came from some other source than the 
damaged pipe in the street, your verdict should 
be for defendant, Byron W. Lundberg, No Cause 
of Action." 
1The respondents feel that these instructions were 
proper and permitted the jury, under the evidence, to 
consider•whether the gas came from a source other than 
the broken main. 
Mr. D. J. Robison testified that the .gas, the gas 
mains, and everything up to and including the meter 
inside the F'riedman home, was owned and controlled 
by the appellant. (R. 230,231, Tr. 96, 97) 
According to the testimony of Davis Watkins, Super-
intendent of Distribution of the appellant, the day fol-
lowing the explosion the gas meter was taken by the 
14 
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appellant. (R. 414, Tr. 28) The testimony of Mr. Wat-
kins as to what examination was made of the meter is 
very interesting. He testified as to the usual course of 
inspection of meters at the shop of the appellant, and 
contended that the meter from the Friedman house was 
given the ·same treatment. He further claimed that tests 
showed it did not leak. 
H()!Wever, it is important to consider that he testified 
he was not present when the gas meter was tested. (R. 
409, 'l1r. 276, R. 410, Tr. 277) The evidence further devel-
oped that it was the custom of the foreman of the shop 
to sign the inspection card which is kept as a permanent 
record on each meter from its purchase by the appellant 
to its removal from service. In this instance, after the 
tests made following the explosion, for some reason the 
foreman did not sign the card. (R. 430, Tr. 296) No 
satisfactory explanation was ever offered for this. 
No one who actually physically handled or inspected 
the Friedman meter was ever called to testify. 
The record further shows that certain repairs were 
made to the meter. Mr. Watkins testified that the gaskets 
were replaced, meter torn down, plates removed, and 
certain other work done upon it. (R. 430, Tr. 296) Mr. 
Watkins contended, of course, that this was standard 
procedure and did not necessarily mean there was any-
thing the matter with the meter. Such testimony, how-
ever, was certainly evidence which the jury had a right 
·to consider in determining in their minds whether the 
meter was or had been defe'ctive. 
Mr. Watkins further testified that no examination 
15 
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of the gas regulator was ever made so far as he knew. 
(R. 431, Tr. 297) 
Mr. Watkins was asked if it were possible for a 
meter to leak in the event the gaskets broke or dried out. 
He testified that it was possible. (R. 438, Tr. 304). 
In connection with the consideration of another 
source of gas than the broken main, testimony of Dr. 
Melvin A. Cook of the University of Utah should be 
carefully considered. 
Dr. Cook is eminently qualified as an explosives 
expert, and his qualifications were examined at some 
length. (R. 172, Tr. 35, 36, 37) Dr. Cook was called to 
make an examination of the premises the day following 
the explosion. He made a narrative statement of the 
kind of investigation he conducted. (R. 176, Tr. 39, 40) 
He testified that the unmistakable physical evidence left 
by the explosion showed that the focal point of the blast 
was immediately above the meter, the gas inlet and the 
regulator. (Exhibit 28, Tr. 47, R. 188, and Exhibit 21, 
Tr. 52, R. 188) 
The following testimony of Dr. Cook is signficant 
on the matter of the place where the gas entered the 
basement. He testified as follows: (R. 190, Tr. 54) 
"Q. Do you have an opinion, from your investiga-
tion, as to the source from which the gas 
came, that entered the basement in the posi-
tion you have testified? 
A. Yes, the evidence of the explosion to me shows 
that the gas came through at the point that 
the gas main-gas line-came into the house. 
Now, where it originated, beyond that, I 
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wouldn't know, except that that was-this 
particular repair-was going on in the front, 
and I assumed that the hreak had occurred 
there, but it was clear to me that it had en-
tered the building, at any rate, on the south 
side of the building, where the gas inlet came 
into the building." 
On cross-examination by counsel for Todd, one !of 
the defendants, the following appears in the record: (R. 
209, Tr. 74) 
"Q. Now, according to your theory of the area of 
concentration-the contour of this blast-had 
there been a meter there that was leaking 
at the time, or immediately prior to the ex-
plosion, could this same contour have o<.r 
curred in the bla;st ~ 
A. Yes. if there were a leak, yes. 
Q. Same kind~ 
A. That's right." 
Dr. Cook's theory of the way in which the explosion 
occurred was that gas jetted in from a point where the 
gas inlet was located and the meter and regulator, and 
with not too much diffusion reached a point approxi-
mately mid-way in the basement, where it was ignited 
by the gas furnace or the pilot light of the gas water 
heater. As a consequence, the greatest point of impact 
and the focal point of the blast was the point near the 
meter, causing singeing and extensive damage to the 
south part of the house, and leaving the north part of 
the basement relatively unscathed. 
In his testimony Dr. Cook carefully explained, by 
the use of numerous photographs to the jury, his theory 
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of how the blast occurred. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 4, 5, 8, 
9,10,21,22,24,25,26.27,28) 
Respondents contend that upon the basis of all of 
this testimony concerning the meter and concerning the 
contour of the blast that there was evidence under In-
structions 25 and 26 from which the jury might reason-
ably and fairly conclude that the source of gas which 
exploded came from the area near the gas inlet line, and 
possibly from a faulty meter or pressure regulator. 
Counsel for the appellant comments on the injuries 
to Mrs. Friedman. The facts concerning the sensation 
she felt and the circumstances which occurred at the 
blast are clearly set forth in the transcript. (R. 144, 145, 
Tr. 8, 9) There can be little question that the portion of 
the house in which Mrs. F'riedman was seated came down 
all around her as if shaken by an earthquake. It is further 
clear that one of the F'riedman children ~sitting close to 
her mother was thrown from her chair by the force of 
the explosion and suffered an injury to her head. (R. 
145, 146, Tr. 9, 10) 
Respondents submit that the physical effect of the 
blast upon Mrs. Friedman is entirely sufficient to justify 
the award made to her. 
In summation of the argument under this point, re-
spondents feel that upon a fair consideration of all the 
evidence before the trial jury the requirement of the 
S'eybold case, has been met. 
"If there is any substantial competent evidence 
upon which a jury, acting fairly and reasonably, 
could make the finding, it should stand" 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING AP-
PELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In appellant's brief, under its Point 2, contending 
that the trial court should have granted a new trial, 
appellant admits that the principal point is whether there 
is substantial evidence upon which the jury could have 
returned the verdict that it did. 
The evidence and argument based upon it is amply 
set forth in the argument under Point I of this brief, 
and we see no useful purpose to be served by repeating 
the ,same material here. 
Appellant also contends that it was prejudiced by 
certain instructions of the trial court. The respondents 
contend that upon a full consideration of the evidence, 
the instructions complained of did not prejudice the ap-
pellant. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED APPEL-
LANT FROM INTRODUCING EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
THE SECOND DEFENSE SET FORTH IN ITS ANSWER. 
The simple question presented by this point is wheth-
er, because the plaintiffs provided themselves with in-
surance against the damage which occurred, the appel-
lant should have the right to insist that the insurance 
company, if any, be made a party to the action, or wheth-
er the defendant is hurt by a non-joinder of the insurance 
company. 
The respondents contend that the only purpose in 
suggesting or requiring the insurance company to be 
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made a party is to be able to bring the fact that the plain-
tiffs had insurance before the jury in an attempt to 
prejudice the plaintiffs thereby. The appellant cannot 
s~riously contend, nor does it, that it might be subjected 
to double liability by any court in this state if the in-
surance company is not made a party. It is abundantly 
clear that the appellant would be completely and absolu-
tely protected against any such result. 
It should be pointed out that before the matter was 
tried, a motion was filed by the respondents to strike 
the second defense. This motion was heard and denied 
by one of the Judges of the Third District Court. 
Thereafter, at the trial, the appellant made an offer 
of proof concerning the second defense, which was denied 
by the trial judge. The respondents are wholly in accord 
with the statement made by the Court when the offer of 
proof was denied, which statement is fully set forth in 
the appellant's brief on page 21. 
It should also be considered that after the motion 
to strike the second defense was denied, the appellant 
made no move or effort to procure an order of court 
requiring the respondents to make the insurance company 
a party. 
Further, there is no contention on the part of the 
appellant that it has or had any defense which might be 
asserted against the insurance company which it was 
not in a position to assert against the plaintiffs and 
respondents. 
In support of the appellant's position, two Utah 
cases are cited, the first, National Union Fire Ins. Co. 
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v. Denver & 1L G. R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, and 
the other, Bank of America 11-,ork v. Smith, 44 Utah 284, 
14(] P. 122. The respondents take the position that neither 
of these cases is in point, based upon the circumstances 
in the case at issue. 
In the National Union Fire Insurance Company 
case, the insurance company sued in its own nmne to 
recover $250.00 which it had paid of a $600.00 loss suf-
fered by the insured. The question in that case was 
not whether the insurance company was a necessary 
party, but whether it had the right to sue at all. The 
case held that the insurance company had the right. The 
respondents contend that the insurance company in this 
case might have sued in its own name, but was not a 
necessary party. 
The Court's attention is invited to the following 
language from the National Union Fire Insurance Com-
pany case, found at page 655 of 137 P.: 
"Starting out with the postulate that under our 
own statute the claim in question was assignable 
and that the real party in interest must sue, why 
could not respondent bring this action upon the 
cause of action in th'is case precisely the same 
as it might sue on any other cause of action 1 Does 
the fact that some other person or persons may 
also have or claim to have some interest in the 
claim sued on deprive the respondent of the right 
to sue 1 We think not." 
The second case cited by appellant involved an 
action by the bank against defendants on a subscription 
contract among them to put up money to build a bri'dge. 
The secretary of the defendants' asso'Ciation borrowed 
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money from the bank on the strength of the agreement. 
The question arose as to whether the bank could sue as 
an equitable assignee of the contract. The Court held 
that the bank was able to bring the action. The case does 
not hold, however, that the signers of the agreement 
would not be able to bring an action based upon it, and 
the following language from that case is pointed out to 
the Court: 
"But no objection was made that the plaintiff was 
not the real party in interest. The defense made 
is based on the ground that in no event are ap-
pellants liable either to the plaintiff or to any one 
else." 
Neither of these cases appears to be a holding that 
the insurance company or an assignee of a right of action 
is a necessary party. In ihe second case cited that ques-
tion was never even raised. 
The respondents are entirely in accord with the 
statement of the trial court in this case which is quoted 
verbatim on page 21 of the appellant's brief. In support 
of that position the responaents invite the Court's atten-
tion to the following Utah cases: 
In the case of Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P. 2d 777, 
there was an action to recover for personal injuries and 
for damage to an automobile as a result of a collision. 
The trial court limited recovery for damage to the car 
to $50.00, which was the amount of the deductible in-
surance contract. 
This court held tliat such a limit was error by the 
trial court. In that case the insurance company was not 
joine'd. The defendant and appellant in that case relied 
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~: 
upon Johansen v. Cudahy Packing Company, 152 P. 2d 
98. In commenting upon the Johansen case, Mr. Justice 
Wade has the following to say, at page 780 of 169 P. 2d: 
" The case was dismissed by the trial court. One 
of the grounds for disn1issal was that the plain-
tiff could not maintain such action because the 
insurance company as a result of the payn1ent had 
been subrogated to the claim of the plaintiff. We 
held that to the extent of the amount paid by it, 
the insurance company was subrogated to the 
claim of the plaintiff, that since plaintiff had a 
claim in excess of the amount paid by the insur-
ance company she was also interested in the claim 
and was a proper party plaintiff and could main-
tain the action, on behalf of herself and as trustee 
for the insurance company; that there was only 
one cause of action which could not be divided 
into two suits; that some courts hold that the in-
surance company would be a proper party plain-
tiff, and some even go so far as to hold that it is 
a necessary party and in case it refused to join 
as plaintiff it must be joined as a defendant, but 
that the failure to join the insurance company 
was at most a defect in parties which defendant 
by its failure to raise had waived and therefore 
the action should proceed in the name of the 
plaintiff alone." 
On the same page the opinion has the following 
language, which the respondents claim is applicable to 
the situation at bar: 
"As pointed out in the Johansen case, supra, even 
though the insurance company is subrogated to 
a part of the claim of the plaintiff, against the 
defendant, that does not create another cause of 
action and there can only be one suit to recover 
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on that cause of action. Thus this action will bar 
any future action on this cause of action whether 
plaintiff recovers the amount paid by the insur-
ance company or not, even though the insurance 
company is not made a party to this action." 
The respondents think that the case of Loggie v. 
Interstate Transit Co., a California case found in 291 P. 
618, is applicable. In that case an action was brought 
to recover for personal injuries and damage to an auto-
mobile. The jury found in favor of the defendant and 
the trial court granted a new trial ba;sed upon miscon-
duct of counsel. The misconduct of counsel was the at-
tempt to show that the plaintiff had insured himself and 
had been compensated for the damage he suffered. The 
following language from that case, found at page 619 
of 291 P., is significant: 
ing: 
"It was error to overrule the objection to the 
foregoing question on cross-examination, because 
it was wholly immaterial whether Renshaw was 
the representative of an indemnity insurance com-
pany, and the jurors doubtless inferred from the 
question and answer that the plaintiff was pro-
tected by such insurance. The offer of proof, 
however, was more prejudicial, implying that the 
plaintiff ha:d been fully compensated for the 
damage to his automobile, and the first thought 
of the jurors, unfamiliar with legal principles, 
probably was that, having received full compensa-
tion for his loss from one person, the plaintiff 
was not entitled to a second recovery for the 
same loss." 
The Court further says on the same page the follow-
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" 'Damages recoverable for a wrong are not 
diminished by the fact that the party injured has 
been wholly .or partly indemnified for his loss by 
insurance effected by him, and to the procurement 
of which the wrong-doer did not contribute; and 
this is equally true * * * though the insurance 
company, by reason of having paid the loss, is 
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the 
insure'd as against the tort-feasor, or to recover 
back from him the amount he recovers. The ques-
tion who will be entitled to the proceeds of the 
recovery, the insurer or the insured, is a matter 
between )'hem, and constitutes no defense to an 
action for the damages caused by the wrong 
which, in any event, must be brought in the name 
of the insured owner although it might be for the 
use of the insurer.' 8 R. C. L. 557; Clark v. Burns 
Hamman Baths, 71 Cal. App. 571,575, 236 P. 152." 
See also the case of Lebet v. Cappobiacho, 102 P. 2d 
1109. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents feel, as hereinbefore stated, that 
a full, fair and complete review of the testimony and of 
the physical exhibits presented to the jury provided it 
with clearly sufficient competent evidence upon which 
their verdict could be based, and the respondents submit 
tnat the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered 
thereon ~should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. 
REX J. HANSON 
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